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Mapping strengths into virtues:
the relation of the 24 VIA-strengths
to six ubiquitous virtues
Willibald Ruch* and René T. Proyer
Personality and Assessment, Department of Psychology, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
The Values-in-Action-classification distinguishes six core virtues and 24 strengths. As
the assignment of the strengths to the virtues was done on theoretical grounds it
still needs empirical verification. As an alternative to factor analytic investigations the
present study utilizes expert judgments. In a pilot study the conceptual overlap among
five sources of knowledge (strength’s name including synonyms, short definitions,
brief descriptions, longer theoretical elaborations, and item content) about a particular
strength was examined. The results show that the five sources converged quite well,
with the short definitions and the items being slightly different from the other. All strengths
exceeded a cut-off value but the convergence was much better for some strengths (e.g.,
zest) than for others (e.g., perspective). In the main study 70 experts (from psychology,
philosophy, theology, etc.) and 41 laypersons rated how prototypical the strengths are
for each of the six virtues. The results showed that 10 were very good markers for their
virtues, nine were good markers, four were acceptable markers, and only one strength
failed to reach the cut-off score for its assigned virtue. However, strengths were often
markers for two or even three virtues, and occasionally they marked the other virtue
more strongly than the one they were assigned to. The virtue prototypicality ratings were
slightly positively correlated with higher coefficients being found for justice and humanity.
A factor analysis of the 24 strengths across the ratings yielded the six factors with an
only slightly different composition of strengths and double loadings. It is proposed to
adjust either the classification (by reassigning strengths and by allowing strengths to be
subsumed under more than one virtue) or to change the definition of certain strengths
so that they only exemplify one virtue. The results are discussed in the context of factor
analytic attempts to verify the structural model.
Keywords: character strengths, virtues, VIA-classification, prototypicality, model testing, positive psychology
Introduction
Both virtues and strengths form essential ingredients of the model of character put forward
by Peterson and Seligman (2004). The study of various writings of philosophers and spiri-
tual leaders in China, South Asia, and the West led to the postulate of six ubiquitous core
virtues, namely courage, justice, humanity, temperance, wisdom, and transcendence (Dahlsgaard
et al., 2005). Virtues are seen as the core characteristics valued by moral philosophers and reli-
gious thinkers. Peterson and Seligman (2004) argued that these virtues are universal, perhaps
grounded in biology through an evolutionary process that selected for these aspects of excellence
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as means of solving the important tasks necessary for survival of
the species. They chose not to measure the virtues as these are too
abstract but put the emphasis on character strengths.
Character strengths were deﬁned as the examples or instances
of the virtues. Peterson and Seligman (2004, p. 13) write that
character strengths are “[. . .] the psychological ingredients – pro-
cesses or mechanisms – that deﬁne the virtues. Said another way,
they are distinguishable routes to displaying one or another of
the virtues. For example, the virtue of wisdom can be achieved
through creativity, curiosity etc. [. . .] These strengths are simi-
lar in that they all involve the acquisition and use of knowledge,
but they are also distinct.” Of lower abstraction is the next level
of the good character, namely situational themes. Situational
themes are deﬁned as the speciﬁc habits that lead people to
manifest given character strengths in given situations, be it work-
related or in family. The situational conditions that enable or
disable strengths have not been studied a lot. Thus, Peterson
and Seligman (2004) found it useful to recognize the compo-
nents of the good character as existing at diﬀerent levels of
abstraction. In this sense the classiﬁcation scheme is not exclu-
sively horizontal (i.e., distinguishing among virtues or strengths)
but also vertical (i.e., specifying diﬀerent conceptual levels in a
hierarchy).
The entries for the classiﬁcation were found in a separate step.
The number of strengths was increased in several steps from 20
to ﬁnally 24. In order to qualify as a character strength, a pos-
itive trait needed to fulﬁll several criteria, such as ubiquity (i.e.,
it is widely recognized across cultures); being fulﬁlling (i.e., it
contributes to individual fulﬁllment, satisfaction, and happiness
broadly construed); being morally valued (i.e., it is valued in
its own right and not as a means to an end); not diminishing
others (i.e., it elevates others who witness it, producing admira-
tion, not jealousy); having a non-felicitous opposite (i.e., it has
obvious antonyms that are “negative,” not also positive); being
trait-like (i.e., it is an individual diﬀerence with demonstrable
generality and stability); measurable (i.e., it has been successfully
measured by researchers as an individual diﬀerence); its distinc-
tiveness (i.e., it is not conceptually or empirically redundant with
other character strengths); the existence of paragons (i.e., it is
strikingly embodied in some individuals), and prodigies (i.e., it
is precociously shown by some children or youths); the possibil-
ity of its selective absence (i.e., it is missing altogether in some
individuals, institutions); and larger societies have provided insti-
tutions or have developed rituals for fostering the strengths (i.e.,
it is the deliberate target of societal practices and rituals that try
to cultivate it). Peterson and Seligman (2004, p. 18) argue that
people typically have between three to seven so-called signature
strengths; i.e., “[. . .] strengths that a person owns, celebrates, and
frequently exercises.” Further they list ten possible criteria for a
signature strength such as a sense of ownership and authenticity,
a feeling of excitement when displaying the strength, or a rapid
learning curve for topics associated with the strength. There is
broad evidence from placebo-controlled intervention studies that
focusing on signature strengths over the course of 1 week has a
beneﬁcial impact on happiness and depression (Seligman et al.,
2005; for an overview see also Proyer et al., 2015). The ﬁnal model
of strengths and virtues is displayed in Table 1.
TABLE 1 | The six virtues and 24 character strengths included in the
Values in Action classification of strengths and short descriptions defining
the strengths and virtues (adapted from Peterson and Seligman, 2004).
(1) Wisdom and knowledge: cognitive strengths that entail the acquisition and use of
knowledge.
• Creativity: thinking of novel and productive ways to do things
• Curiosity: taking an interest in all of ongoing experience
• Open-mindedness: thinking things through and examining them from all sides
• Love of learning: mastering new skills, topics, and bodies of knowledge
• Perspective: being able to provide wise counsel to others
(2) Courage: emotional strengths that involve the exercise of will to accomplish goals
in the face of opposition, external or internal.
• Authenticity: speaking the truth and presenting oneself in a genuine way
• Bravery: not shrinking from threat, challenge, difficulty, or pain
• Persistence: finishing what one starts
• Zest: approaching life with excitement and energy
(3) Humanity: interpersonal strengths that involve “tending and befriending” others.
• Kindness: doing favors and good deeds for others
• Love: valuing close relations with others
• Social intelligence: being aware of the motives and feelings of self and others
(4) Justice: civic strengths that underlie healthy community life.
• Fairness: treating all people the same according to notions of fairness and justice
• Leadership: organizing group activities and seeing that they happen
• Teamwork: working well as member of a group or team
(5) Temperance: strengths that protect against excess.
• Forgiveness: forgiving those who have done wrong
• Modesty: letting one’s accomplishments speak for themselves
• Prudence: being careful about one’s choices; not saying or doing things that
might later be regretted
• Self-regulation: regulating what one feels and does
(6) Transcendence: strengths that forge connections to the larger universe and
provide meaning.
• Appreciation of beauty and excellence: noticing and appreciating beauty,
excellence, and/or skilled performance in all domains of life
• Gratitude: being aware of and thankful for the good things that happen
• Hope: expecting the best and working to achieve it
• Humor: liking to laugh and tease; bringing smiles to other people
• Spirituality: having coherent beliefs about the higher purpose and meaning of life
The six core virtues are constituted by three to ﬁve character
strengths, and the assignment of the strengths to the virtue cate-
gories was done on theoretical grounds as opposed to empirically.
Later, attempts to examine the model by utilizing factor analy-
sis of the 24 strengths were put forward, but failed to ﬁnd the
proposed six factors. More frequently a solution with ﬁve factors
has been described—occasionally much to the disappointment of
the authors (for a review, see e.g., McGrath, 2014; see also Ruch
et al., 2010). In the present manuscript we will ﬁrst examine the
model of the good character closer and then suggest performing
an alternative test for its structure.
Some Testable Assumptions in the
Character Model
There are a variety of testable (and partly yet untested)
assumptions associated with the VIA-classiﬁcation. One relates
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to the condensation of the sources studied by Dahlsgaard et al.
(2005) to the “high six.” Would other researchers studying the
same writings arrive at the same six core values? Typically, in
such a study one would expect an index of convergence among
coders. Thus, a valuable but maybe strenuous task would be to
go through the literature and cluster the virtues lists or to rate
for each of the entries of the virtue lists studied to the degree
of prototypicality of each of the virtues. This will help conﬁrm-
ing the validity of the selection of virtues in the VIA-model. It
should be mentioned that alternative approaches exist to deﬁne
virtues factors, namely through a psycho-lexical approach (e.g.,
De Raad and Van Oudenhoven, 2011). Here a longer list of virtue
terms from the dictionary is administered to participants for self-
report. Virtue factors are then extracted from the intercorrelation
of terms administered for self-description. Thus, for example, a
virtue factor of “humanity” is dependent on the existence of a suf-
ﬁcient number of other terms that are related to humanity (i.e.,
related concepts, variants, facets) and of individuals systemati-
cally diﬀering in the endorsement of the terms representing these
concepts. In other words, humanity, like other classic virtues,
would only emerge as a factor of humanity if enough everyday
terms exist that somehow reﬂect humanity.
A second testable element is the overall relation between
strengths/virtues and the “good character.” Peterson and
Seligman (2004, p. 13) speculate that all of these virtues must
be present at above-threshold values for an individual to be
deemed of good character and state that “[a]gain, we regard
these strengths as ubiquitously recognized and valued, although
a given individual will rarely if ever display all of them. We are
comfortable saying that someone is of good character if he or
she displays but 1 or 2 strengths within a virtue group.” This
assertion contains several elements and challenges. One element
to be tested is the perception that the goodness of the charac-
ter reaches its maximum (and does not progress anymore from
there) when all six (rather than merely various combinations
of ﬁve—or less) virtues are saliently present. This is also based
on the assumption that all virtues are needed for a “good char-
acter” and that the present list of six is suﬃcient. In fact, the
weight of each of the virtues in the deﬁnition of the “good char-
acter” could be empirically determined. It will be of interest
to see then the distribution of a random sample of adults on
such a goodness dimension; i.e., how many have all six virtues
above threshold, how many ﬁve and so on. A core challenge is
to deﬁne and validate a criterion for the presence of a strength.
What expression of the strengths is needed to speak of “above-
threshold values”? Next, the needed critical mass of strengths
within a virtue group could be determined empirically as well.
Clearly there would be diﬀerent types of research strategies (e.g.,
perception studies, predicting criterion behavior) to answer this
question. One might also argue that it is not useful to apply
the notion of good character to individuals at all but only to
the family of strengths and virtues that deﬁne it at a conceptual
level.
A third possible test examines the relation between character
strengths and virtues. As mentioned before, virtually everyone
working with the standard instrument for the subjective assess-
ment of character strengths, the Values-in-Action Inventory of
Strengths (VIA-IS; Peterson et al., 2005), thus far was performing
a factor analysis (or principal component analysis, or conﬁrma-
tory factor analysis) to examine whether the respective strength
loads on the virtue factor it was “assigned” to. It should be noted
though that nowhere in the original work it is stated that the
VIA-classiﬁcation represents a factor model of character where
the virtues are derived from the intercorrelation of the strengths.
Occasionally, factor analyses of the strengths are performed with
the expectation to arrive at the virtues proposed by Peterson and
Seligman (2004), and then the loading of a strength on these fac-
tors is taken as a criterion that the strength indeed belongs to
the virtue. Peterson and Seligman (2004) do not explicitly specify
how their model should be adequately tested, but two strategies
seem to be compatible with their writings. Several statements
seem to speak against the idea that solely the intercorrelations
among the strengths should be used to deﬁne the virtues; this
is when they write that processes or mechanisms deﬁning the
virtues, or distinguishable routes to displaying one or another of
the virtues, and that “a given individual will rarely, if ever, dis-
play all of them” (Peterson and Seligman, 2004, p. 13). Having to
display only one or two strengths in a virtue group implies that
being high in some of the strengths of a virtue does not necessar-
ily mean that one needs to be high in other strengths as well to
have that strength subsumed under the same virtue. This is plau-
sible, as one might argue that there are several diﬀerent routes to
wealth (such as inheriting money/property, working hard, rob-
bing a bank, gambling successfully, marrying rich, etc.) that do
not need to be pursued by the same person to the same extent
to make them intercorrelate and form a factor. So these state-
ments clearly indicate that no strict factor model of character
is implied. However, in the same book, Peterson and Seligman
(2004, p. 26) also mention that correlations with other strengths
might serve as a criterion; they note: “We measured only the
strengths, and if the data suggest—for example—that playful-
ness belongs elsewhere because of its co-occurrence with other
strengths, we will gladly move it.” Here the other strengths (and
the co-occurrence with them) are used as a criterion for belong-
ing rather than its conceptual relation with the virtue (i.e., being
a process or mechanism). Nevertheless, while occasionally fac-
tor analyses of the VIA-scales have been conducted by these
researchers, the outcome of the studies were not meant to change
the classiﬁcation—rather they can be seen as an investigation
of the factor structure of a questionnaire. There were discus-
sions to collapse strengths based on the factor analyses to avoid
redundancy though (Park and Peterson, 2005). These researchers
found four to ﬁve factors in the instruments for adults and chil-
dren/adolescents or a two-factor solution when using ipsative
scores (Peterson, 2006).
If factor analysis is not the golden path to test the model
what is? For this we need to look into the nature of the model
applied. First, it needs to be noted that the hierarchical classi-
ﬁcation of positive characteristics put forward was modeled on
the Linnaean classiﬁcation of species, which also ranges from
the concrete and speciﬁc (the individual organism) through
increasingly abstract and general categories (population, sub-
species, species, genus, family, order, class, phylum, kingdom,
and domain). Peterson and Seligman (2004) distinguish the three
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conceptual levels of situational themes (most speciﬁc), character
strengths (intermediate), and virtues (most global). Thus, apply-
ing Linnaean thinking one would need to specify what attributes
of the strengths (or situational themes) might be used in their
conceptual classiﬁcation—and not individual diﬀerences in the
strengths (as essential for factor analytic models). Thus, this
assumption needs to be tested conceptually; for example, in a ﬁrst
step by asking experts how good a strength is as an example for
each of the six virtues; i.e., into what branch of virtue a strength
falls.
The last of the testable assumptions sounds most important
as it might provide an alternative to the prior testing of the
model. Hence, the present manuscript will examine how good
an example each of the 24 strengths is for the six virtues. The
major prerequisite for such a study is tested in a pilot study that
is aimed at making sure that the diﬀerent domains of informa-
tion (e.g., names of the strengths, items, theories of the strengths)
are consistent. This is important to know to be able to select the
appropriate source of information about a strength to be related
to the virtues.
Pilot Study: Convergence of Indicators
of the Strengths
The aim of the pilot study is to examine the degree of con-
ceptual overlap among several domains of information about
signature strengths. It is important to ascertain for each character
strength that there is a suﬃciently high coherence between dif-
ferent sources of knowledge about the strengths. The information
examined in the present study includes the names of the strengths
including synonyms (e.g., Creativity [originality, ingenuity]), the
deﬁnitions of the strengths (e.g., thinking of novel and produc-
tive ways to do things), brief descriptions of the strengths (e.g., as
provided in the feedback to the test takers), a longer theoretical
elaboration of the strengths, and the actual item contents. A pair-
wise comparison among all possible pairs of the ﬁve elements will
tell whether all ﬁve domains cover the strengths (a) suﬃciently
well, (b) are equal or diﬀerently well suited, and (c) whether all
strengths are suﬃciently coherent, and (d) some strengths are
more consistent than others.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The sample consisted of 20 German-speaking adults (16 female,
4 male) that served as expert raters. Their mean age was 28 years
(ranging from 17 to 49 years). They were either students of psy-
chology or currently working on their Ph.D. in psychology. Eight
of them were already familiar with the VIA classiﬁcation.
Instruments
Strength Definition Comparison Task
Participants were provided with a two page sheet for each
strength. The ﬁrst one contained ﬁve diﬀerent sources of infor-
mation for the strength, and the second the instruction and
10 rating scales. The ﬁve domains of information were (a) the
German (and English) names of the scales (including the syn-
onyms), e.g., Creativity (originality, ingenuity), (b) the short
deﬁnition of the respective strength (e.g., “thinking of novel and
productive ways to do things”), (c) a short description of the high
scorer (the text was taken from the feedback to the participants
that complete the VIA-IS and typically contained between 2 and
5 lines), (d) a more elaborate description of the strengths taken
from Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) original work (between 7
and 11 lines), and (e) the actual 10 items from the VIA-IS used
to measure this strength. They were instructed to study the ﬁve
sources and then to perform 10 pairwise comparisons of the ﬁve
domains regarding the degree of overlap of the two sources. This
was done on an 11-point scale with anchored steps (0 = not at
all similar, 2 = somewhat similar, but strong conceptual diﬀer-
ences, 4 = similar but conceptually diﬀerent, 6 = similar but
not completely identical, 8 = very similar, and 10 = completely
identical).
Procedure and Data Analysis
Data were collected through paper-and-pencil administration.
Participants were instructed to do these 240 pairwise compar-
isons on their own, at their own tempo, and they should take a
break if needed. Both the order of strengths and the order of the
10 comparisons of strengths were counterbalanced. Participants
were provided with a page with the instructions and the material,
and on a separate page they did perform the pairwise com-
parisons. The task lasted about 21/2 h. Participants were not
remunerated for their eﬀorts. Data were then averaged to get the
240 mean scores for each pairwise comparison and the strengths.
They were then further averaged sequentially (across the compar-
isons, across strengths) to get scores for the 24 strengths, the ﬁve
domains, and the 10 types of comparisons.
Results and Discussion
The grand average of all comparisons was 7.1 indicating that
overall there was a considerable overlap, which can be described
as being midway between “similar” and “very similar.” This is
a high level of coherence in the description of the strengths.
At the next lower level of aggregation two types of information
can be examined, namely how the conceptual overlap among
ﬁve sources of knowledge is for each strength (see Table 2, last
column) and how strongly each of the ﬁve domains overlaps
on average with the others (see Table 2, last row). Finally, the
pairwise overlap between the ﬁve domains (collapsed over the
strengths) is shown in Table 3.
The level of convergence regarding the strengths ranged from
6.2 (i.e., more than “similar”) to 7.8 (i.e., almost “very similar”).
This demonstrates that the strengths were more or less consis-
tently described as they are. However, if an improvement in con-
vergence of descriptions is sought, Table 2 also lists the strengths
where improvement is possible (e.g., creativity, love of learning,
leadership, modesty, and perspective), while for other strengths
(i.e., zest, humor, appreciation of beauty and excellence, open-
mindedness, gratitude) the convergence was already very good.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 460
Ruch and Proyer Mapping character strengths
TABLE 2 | Mean similarity of sources of information about the strength as derived from the pairwise comparisons.
Label Definition Feedback Description Items Total
Perspective 6.4 5.7 6.6 6.6 5.7 6.2
Modesty 6.5 6.0 6.6 6.7 6.4 6.4
Leadership 6.8 5.9 6.8 7.0 6.3 6.5
Love of learning 6.9 5.8 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.7
Creativity 6.9 6.5 7.1 6.7 6.5 6.7
Bravery 6.8 6.7 7.0 6.9 6.5 6.8
Honesty 7.1 6.5 6.8 6.9 6.6 6.8
Love 7.2 6.3 7.0 7.2 6.7 6.9
Teamwork 6.4 6.6 7.0 7.3 7.0 6.9
Kindness 6.8 6.7 7.2 7.0 6.8 6.9
Prudence 7.5 6.8 7.2 7.2 6.5 7.0
Persistence 7.2 6.8 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.1
Curiosity 7.4 6.8 7.4 7.4 7.1 7.2
Self-regulation 7.5 7.0 7.5 7.3 6.9 7.2
Fairness 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.2 7.1 7.3
Hope 7.5 7.3 7.1 7.3 7.2 7.3
Spirituality 7.4 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.2 7.3
Forgiveness 7.7 7.3 7.5 7.1 7.1 7.3
Social Intelligence 7.7 7.0 7.4 7.4 7.2 7.3
Gratitude 7.8 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.4
Open-mindedness 7.7 7.1 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.5
Beauty and excellence 7.6 7.3 7.6 7.7 7.2 7.5
Humor 7.6 7.2 7.6 7.8 7.7 7.6
Zest 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.8
Total 7.2 6.8 7.2 7.2 6.9 7.1
TABLE 3 | Mean convergence between the five descriptions of the
strengths.
A B C D E
A (scale labels) 10.0 6.8 7.5 7.6 7.0
B (one-line definitions) 10.0 7.0 6.8 6.5
C (descriptions in feedback) 10.0 7.3 7.0
D (elaborated descriptions) 10.0 7.2
E (item contents) 10.0
Likewise, the ﬁve sources of information about the strengths
overlap very well with the others (Table 2, last row). Nevertheless,
the labels (names, plus synonyms; 7.2), the shorter (7.2) and
longer (7.2) descriptions of the strengths yielded high average
scores in similarity being again midway between “similar” and
“very similar.” The unexpected result was that the labels of the
scales yielded the same scores as the description of the strengths
(as in the feedback) and the even longer descriptions of the
strengths. This might be due to the fact that the words and syn-
onyms are properly chosen and do cover the substance of the
strength well. The items yielded a somewhat lower average mean
(6.9) and also the one-line deﬁnitions (6.8) of the strength were
somewhat lower. While the variation was not large it is surprising
that the items do yield the lowest score.
The inspection of the next lower level of aggregation indicates
for each of the 24 strengths how the single sources of information
overlapwith the four remaining ones.Table 2 (columns 2–6) con-
ﬁrms that the diﬀerent levels of information about the strengths
do converge to a suﬃcient to very good level. Most importantly,
every single of the 240 comparisons (10 among the ﬁve resources,
for 24 strengths) was above 5.0 and only four were lower than
6.0. The one-line deﬁnitions for perspective, love of learning,
and leadership were lower than 6.0, as were the set of items for
perspective. All the others at least exceeded the threshold (i.e.,
exceeded the “similar, but not identical” cut-oﬀ score). For zest
all ﬁve indicators yielded high scores, and while for humor the
scores were generally very high, the one-line deﬁnition was com-
paratively lower. For appreciation of beauty and excellence, both
the one-line deﬁnitions and the items were comparatively lower
(albeit still at a very high level of convergence).
Are there some sources of description that systematically con-
verge better than others? Table 3 shows that the one-line deﬁni-
tions and the item contents not only had the lower scores for con-
vergence, they also had the lowest pairwise overlap (6.5), which,
however, is still well beyond cut-oﬀ value and can be phrased as
“more than similar but not conceptually identical.” The highest
overlap was between the labels and the longer descriptions (7.6)
and it can be described as close to “very similar” (see Table 3).
One might consider it worrying that the items (that constitute
the measuring of the strengths in the VIA-IS) yielded lower
scores. However, Table 3 shows that the 10 items not only
captured well what is covered in the feedback text and in the
longer description, but also converged well with the labels and
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synonyms. Thus, the labels already capture what is in the items.
The one-line deﬁnitions converged best with the feedback text,
and comparatively lower with the other sources of information.
Thus, for the main study the brief descriptions (as used in feed-
back to participants) will be used to represent the strengths, as
they are a good compromise between brevity (of material) and
the level of saturation of the respective concept.
Main study: What Strengths are
Prototypical for What Virtues?
Now that it is established that the brief description of the
strengths contains the relevant information about the strengths,
this layer of information may be used as a representative index
in a new study to get estimates of how prototypical each of the
strengths is for each of the six virtues. In order to ascertain a stan-
dardized understanding of what the virtues are, the raters need
to be provided with the deﬁnitions of the virtues by Peterson
and Seligman (2004) and be instructed to base their judgment on
these deﬁnitions even if they deviate from their own. Then a rat-
ing scale needs to be designed with anchored steps that then allow
interpreting the scores. A six-point scale will be utilized and the
scale will be anchored in a way, that 3.5 is the cut-oﬀ point that
needs to be reached to argue that the strengths can be seen as the
lower bound of prototypicality for the virtue. A score of 4 will be
the lower bound for a good marker and 5 is the cut-oﬀ for being a
very good marker for the virtue. The rating will include all virtues
to be able to see whether the prototypicality is indeed highest for
the assigned virtue.
As the six virtues were sought to be representative and dis-
tinct, there are reasons to assume that judges will be able to use
these scales quite independently form each other and there will
be low intercorrelations. However, a correlation between judg-
ments of humanity and justice can be expected and there will also
be an overlap between the strengths related to humanity and jus-
tice. Peterson and Seligman (2004, p. 293) note: “The entries in
this virtue class [humanity] resemble those we identify as justice
strengths, with the diﬀerence being that strengths of humanity
and love are brought to bear in one-to-one relationships, whereas
those of justice are most relevant in one-to-many relationships.
The former strengths are interpersonal, the latter broadly social.”
With regards to justice, Peterson and Seligman (2004, p. 357)
argue: “We regard strengths of justice as broadly interpersonal,
relevant to the optimal interaction between the individual and
the group or the community. As the group shrinks in size and
becomes more personalized, the strengths of justice begin to con-
verge with the one-on-one strengths of love discussed in the
previous section. We maintain the distinction by proposing that
strengths of justice are strengths among, whereas those of love are
strengths between, but the diﬀerence is perhaps more of degree
than kind.”
This study will use experts of diﬀerent ﬁelds and laypersons to
directly estimate to which virtues the strengths belong. While the
VIA-classiﬁcation was based on the discussions among experts
(in the think tanks preceding the publication), their number was
limited and there was also no report on a formal procedure how
agreement was established. Also the experts were mostly psy-
chologists, and one can argue that psychologists are not ideally
suited for this task. They might understand strengths well, but
virtues were not a topic in psychology at that time, and psycholo-
gists might hesitate thinking in terms of virtues, and in particular
transcendence is a virtue that is unfamiliar (e.g., Allport, 1937).
So it would be good to look for other types of experts as well.
Philosophers are familiar with virtue catalogs, but they might
doubt the validity of the transcendence category and might also
not be that familiar with the strengths concept. Experts might also
come from the ﬁeld of theology and religious studies. They will
be familiar with transcendence and not hesitate to give higher
prototypicality ratings. One needs to consider that transcendence
might mean diﬀerent things in theology and philosophy. Besides
religious studies, there are also hybrid studies, such as psychology
of religion, religious education. It will be necessary to represent
(personality) psychology, philosophy, and theology to get a more
balanced view. Experts should be better in their assignments
than laypersons although the average rating of laypersons will be
valid as well. Thus, the sample should cover also laypersons and
examine how they compare to experts.
It is assumed that experts will assign the strengths to the
virtues in the same way as Peterson and Seligman (2004) did. As
already stated deviations might occur: some strength might go
under a diﬀerent virtue (e.g., humor maybe may be located under
humanity or wisdom, rather than transcendence) or be related to
more than one virtue (e.g., social intelligence might be related to
humanity and wisdom).
Materials and Methods
Participants
The sample consisted 70 experts and 41 laypersons (38.7%
women). Their mean age was 41.09 years (SD = 15.95; ranging
from 19 to 87 years). Regarding the expert sample larger subsets
came from philosophy (n = 20), psychology (n = 19), theology
(n = 17), and psychology/pedagogy of religion (n = 9).
Instruments
The Strength-Virtue Prototypicality Judgment
Instrument
The instrument ﬁrst contains an instruction followed by deﬁni-
tions of the virtues and the strengths. The descriptions of the
virtues were derived from Peterson and Seligman (2004) and
varied in lengths with a minimum of 30 and a maximum of
49 words. The description of the strengths were the same as
in Study 1. The task was to indicate how good an example1
the 24 strengths are for each of the six virtues using a six-
point scale (1 = not at all, 2 = marginally, 3 = not very good,
4 = quite good, 5 = good, and 6 = very good). There was also
an empty slot to add a further virtue and rate the degree of
prototypicality.
1The use of this criterion over others (e.g., whether this strength is a route to dis-
playing a virtue, or a means for achieving virtue) was recommended by Peterson
(2006).
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Procedure
The study was conducted via the internet using the
SurveyMonkey platform. Experts were either personality
psychologists or had a strong link to virtue and came from
the following ﬁelds: personality, philosophy, ethics, theology,
psychology of religion, or pedagogy of theology. They were
initially spotted at university websites (departments of psychol-
ogy, theology, philosophy etc.), membership lists of professional
societies and approached via email and asked to participate in the
study. About 70% of the experts actually agreed to participate.
They typically were professors in the respective ﬁeld or were
holding a Ph.D. and specialized in the ﬁeld. Laypersons had no
particular background in personality and/or virtues. Typically
these were students or relatives of students. As a double check
all participants were asked to indicate their level of expertise in
these ﬁelds in the survey. They received no compensation for
participating in the study but were promised a written summary
on the main ﬁndings of the study.
Data Analysis
The main analysis will be rather simple and involve an averag-
ing of the prototypicality scores and presenting them in a table
with 6 virtues and 24 strengths. Applying the cut-oﬀ scores one
can then see whether a strength is not marker (1.0–3.5) a marker
(>3.5), a good marker (>4.0) or a very good marker (>5.0) for
a virtue. Then we will count how many of the 24 strengths do
actually mark the virtue they are assigned for and at what level.
We can also see how often a strength is a marker for a virtue
it was not original assigned to. One can also count how often
a strength marks more than one virtue, and whether the proto-
typicality score is higher for the assigned virtue than for another.
To examine whether expert status (experts, laypersons) matters
and to remove a bias due to age and gender, a 6 × 24 ANCOVA
with the six virtues and the 24 strengths on the repeated mea-
sure factors and expert status (experts, laypersons) as a grouping
variable and gender and age as covariates will be computed for
the prototypicality ratings. Of the possible eﬀects only the virtue
times strength interaction is of prime interest and some of the
eﬀects (e.g., covariates, interaction with covariates) are neglected
altogether as the aim is only to get an estimate for a prototyp-
icality score that is unbiased by these variables. Furthermore,
similar analyses will be computed to test whether type of raters
(type of expert, layperson) matters to then apply the cut-oﬀ
scores and see how well the strengths mark the virtues. It is
not attempted to do post hoc tests to see whether mean scores
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (i.e., whether a strength is signiﬁcantly
more prototypical for one virtue than for a diﬀerent virtue; or
whether a virtue is more linked to one strength than to the other
strength).
Two analyses will be computed to show the structure inher-
ent in the virtues and in the strength. The results of the analyses
should be valid across the other two modes (rater, and strengths
or virtues). The correlations of the virtue prototypicality rat-
ings were computed across participants and strengths, but not
tested for signiﬁcance. Here it will not actually be of interest to
see whether a correlation is “signiﬁcant” but to demonstrate that
the judgments are relatively independent—with the exception of
humanity and justice. Finally, the similarity among the strengths
(across raters and virtues) will be examined and analyzed in a
lower dimensional space. A principal component analysis will be
performed on the intercorrelations among the 24 strengths. The
number of factors will be examined using the Scree test and a
Varimax rotation will be performed. The resulting matrix allows
investigating whether the strengths assigned to a virtue actu-
ally form a joint factor when the intercorrelations are based on
the prototypicality ratings for the virtues; i.e., strengths load on
the same factor when they are rated high on the same virtues.
Individuals also enter into the mode analyzed but not regard-
ing how much they possess that strength but how they see the
strength-virtue connections.
Results
Prototypicality Ratings
The correlations of the prototypicality ratings for the six virtues
(across participants and strengths) were computed and are pre-
sented in Table 4.
Table 4 shows that all intercorrelations were positive. As
expected, the correlations are higher for justice and humanity;
i.e., when a strength was considered prototypical for humanity it
also tended to be prototypical for justice. High prototypicality for
justice was also correlated with the temperance judgments. The
other correlations were lower than 0.40. Thus, overall the partici-
pants discriminated well among all six virtues and they saw justice
somewhat more correlated with both humanity and temperance.
How Prototypical are the Strengths for the
Virtues?
A 6 × 24 ANCOVA with the six virtues and the 24
strengths on the repeated measure factors and expert status
(experts, laypersons), gender and age as a grouping variable
was computed for the prototypicality ratings. The covariates
had no main eﬀects (p > 0.14), but were involved in some
interactions. The main eﬀect of virtues was not signiﬁcant
[F(5,535) = 1.119, p = 0.349], and the virtue ratings did not
interact with any of the three covariates (p > 0.51). There was
a main eﬀect for strengths [F(23,2461) = 3.414, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.031], and more importantly a strengths-virtue interac-
tion, F(115,12305) = 4.493, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.040. While the
strengths interacted with all covariates (ps < 0.012; η2p = 0.016–
0.022), the virtue × strength interaction did not depend on
gender or expert status (ps > 0.015), but was moderated by age,
F(115,12305) = 1.493, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.014. These eﬀects were
not further explored, as they were small and seemed diﬃcult to
generalize to other studies. However, they were being controlled
for in the mean prototypicality ratings presented in Table 5.
Table 5 shows that nine strengths were very good markers
(prototypicality > 5.0) and 11 were good markers (prototypi-
cality > 4.0) for the virtue they were assigned to. Three more
exceeded the 3.5 threshold (i.e., were quite good markers) and
only humor did not reach the threshold for being prototypical
for the virtue it was assigned to (i.e., >3.5). Humor seemed to be
a marker for humanity. Two other strengths had a numerically
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TABLE 4 | Intercorrelation among the prototypicality ratings for the six virtues.
Courage Humanity Justice Temperance Transcendence
Wisdom 0.24 0.23 0.32 0.28 0.27
Courage 0.20 0.34 0.13 0.20
Humanity 0.59 0.34 0.33
Justice 0.41 0.23
Temperance 0.19
N = 2664.
TABLE 5 | Mean prototypicality of each the 24 strengths for the six virtues (controlled for effects of gender, age, expert status) as well as the overall
virtue prototypicality.
Wisdom Courage Humanity Justice Temperance Transcendence Overall
Creativity 4.27 3.78 2.46 1.97 1.78 2.89 2.89
Curiosity 4.82 3.80 2.78 2.19 1.84 3.12 3.09
Open-mindedness 5.44 3.44 3.13 3.98 2.96 2.66 3.58
Love of learning 5.31 2.95 2.71 2.21 2.27 2.87 3.06
Perspective 5.80 2.75 3.73 3.85 3.41 3.56 3.83
Bravery 2.73 5.92 3.09 3.30 2.58 2.66 3.37
Persistence 3.57 4.05 2.56 2.94 3.77 2.40 3.27
Honesty 3.60 4.26 3.69 4.15 2.94 2.78 3.59
Zest 2.63 4.32 2.68 2.24 1.84 2.78 2.72
Love 2.79 3.06 5.25 3.13 3.00 3.49 3.48
Kindness 2.70 2.48 5.40 3.10 2.65 3.06 3.22
Social intelligence 4.28 2.72 4.76 3.96 3.21 2.51 3.57
Teamwork 3.14 2.62 4.58 4.23 3.45 2.75 3.51
Fairness 3.43 3.05 4.41 5.86 3.36 2.79 3.83
Leadership 3.93 4.14 3.54 3.92 2.92 2.24 3.48
Forgiveness 3.67 3.05 5.47 4.02 3.71 3.65 3.93
Modesty 3.28 2.14 3.70 2.91 4.76 3.29 3.36
Prudence 4.14 2.05 2.77 2.76 4.63 2.29 3.10
Self-regulation 3.33 2.78 2.69 2.78 5.70 2.60 3.32
Beauty 3.63 2.06 2.82 1.91 1.91 4.26 2.71
Gratitude 3.21 2.14 4.57 3.55 3.06 3.72 3.34
Hope 3.08 3.92 3.41 2.68 2.35 4.10 3.26
Humor 3.30 2.78 3.96 2.09 2.10 2.47 2.76
Spirituality 2.83 2.27 3.01 2.58 2.78 5.72 3.19
Beauty = Appreciation of beauty and excellence. Virtue assignment in Peterson and Seligman (2004) are shown in boldface; italics indicate strengths that are more
prototypical for a virtue other than the assigned one.
higher prototypicality for a diﬀerent virtue than its own, namely
teamwork (for humanity in addition to justice) and gratitude
(for humanity in addition to transcendence). For two strengths
there were two additional virtues at least equally relevant: for-
giveness was more prototypical for humanity and justice than
it was for temperance, and leadership was more relevant for
courage and for wisdom than it was for justice. It should be
mentioned that four strengths (that marked the own virtue best)
were also good markers (>4.0) for a further virtue: honesty for
justice, social intelligence and prudence for wisdom, and fair-
ness for humanity. Said in a diﬀerent way, of the strengths that
were a very good marker for their virtue only one was also
a marker for a diﬀerent virtue. Of the 11 strengths that were
good markers for their virtue four also marked a second virtue.
Finally, all three strengths that were quite good markers for their
own virtue also were good or very good markers for one or
two other virtues. Thus, for seven strengths no “one to one”-
correspondence to a virtue could be found but they proved to
be more complex. The only strength that was wrongly assigned
turned out not to be complex with only being prototypical for
humanity.
As there also was a powerful main eﬀect, the overall virtuous-
ness rating will be considered, too (see last column in Table 5).
It is evident from Table 5 that the strengths with the lower scores
had both a lower prototypicality rating for the assigned virtue and
also fewer virtues they were prototypical for. These strengths (i.e.,
high curiosity, love of learning, creativity, humor, zest, appreci-
ation of beauty and excellence) also did not feel very virtuous
compared to the ones with a high total score (i.e., forgiveness,
perspective, fairness, honesty, open-mindedness, and social intel-
ligence), which all marked justice and tended to mark humanity
and wisdom.
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Does the Nature of the Experts Matter?
A 3 × 6 × 24 ANCOVA with the expert type (psychologists,
philosophers, theologians) as grouping factor, the six virtues
and the 24 strengths on the repeated measure factors, and
gender and age as covariates was computed for the proto-
typicality ratings. There was a strong eﬀect of type of experts
[F(1,61) = 20,681, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.404], and the post hoc tests
(Fishers PSL) showed that the theology group (M = 4.06) was
higher (p < 0.001) than both the philosophers (M = 2.91) and
psychologists (M = 2.73), which did not diﬀer from each other
(p = 0.55). Furthermore, type of expert was also involved in an
interaction with virtue (η2p = 0.102), strengths (η2p = 0.057) and
the virtue × strength interaction (η2p = 0.093). Therefore, three
separate 6 × 24 ANCOVAs were performed with the six virtues
and the 24 strengths on the repeated measure factors, and gender
and age as covariates were computed for the prototypicality
ratings for the three groups. For the psychologists, the rating for
wisdom was higher and the one for transcendence was lower than
all others. Furthermore, humanity was rated higher than justice
and temperance. For philosophers, both humanity and wisdom
were higher than all others, transcendence was lower than justice,
but not signiﬁcantly lower than courage and temperance. For the
theology group there were three clusters of virtues that diﬀered
from each other but not within: temperance was lower than all
other virtues, humanity and wisdom were highest and courage,
justice, and transcendence were in between (see Figure 1).
Furthermore, the interactions between virtues and strengths
were all signiﬁcant at p < 0.001 (η2p: psychologist = 0.132,
philosophers = 0.129, and theologians = 0.075). Analyses like
the one in Table 5 were performed for the three groups sepa-
rately (The table is available upon request). A count of proper
and false assignments was undertaken. Overall, 96.7% of the
strengths were assigned properly (see Table 5) and there were
24.0% of the cases where a strength exceeded 3.5 for a certain
virtue. This analysis illuminated the rating behaviors of the three
groups. The theologians did have a 100% hit rate for the assigned
FIGURE 1 | Mean prototypicality rating for the 24 strengths in the six
virtues for the groups of psychologists, philosophers, and theologians.
virtues, but also had 76.6% “false” assignments. Psychologists
(75.00%) and philosophers (83.33%) did not judge all strengths
being prototypical for the assigned virtue, but they also did
not make many “false” assignments (psychologists: 9.27% and
philosophers: 13.02%). In other words, the theology group erred
on the overinclusion side: they did not miss any strength linked
to a virtue, but saw many strengths linked to many virtues.
Most strikingly, they saw each strength exceeding the proto-
typicality cut-oﬀ point for both wisdom and humanity. The
psychologists and philosophers only did catch two out of the ﬁve
transcendence strengths and also missed one (or two) strengths
of justice. They did agree on what is a second marker. Wisdom
also covered social intelligence and prudence, humanity covers
teamwork, forgiveness, and gratitude, and courage also covered
leadership.
The Structure of Strengths as Reflected in
the Virtue Prototypicality Ratings
Next, the 24 strengths were intercorrelated across raters and
virtues (111 × 6 = 666 data points) simultaneously and sub-
jected to a principal component analysis. Five Eigenvalues were
greater one and the scree test suggested the retention of 5 or 6 fac-
tors (Eigenvalues: 8.25, 2.90, 1.93, 1.80, 1.41, 0.82, 0.68, 0.65, and
0.51). Both solutions were inspected and the six-factor solution
(which explained 71.3% of the variance) was found to be more
meaningful. The Varimax-rotated factors are given in Table 6.
The factor of wisdom and knowledge explained 15.2% of the
variance and not only encompasses creativity, curiosity, judg-
ment, love of learning, and perspective, but also and to a lower
extent appreciation of beauty and excellence, humor, and social
intelligence. The latter three had double loadings and were also
marking other factors. The factor of courage (12.5%) was clearly
loaded by bravery and zest, and to a lower extent by endurance,
and honesty, which also loaded on the factors of temperance
and justice, respectively. Hope, leadership, and creativity also
loaded on courage—all of them demonstrated double loadings.
While the temperance strengths of modesty, prudence, and self-
regulation were complemented by endurance, temperance (9.8%)
was not loaded by forgiveness. Forgiveness (and partly also mod-
esty), the strengths of humanity (love, kindness, and to a lower
extent social intelligence), some strengths of justice (teamwork,
fairness) marked the ﬁrst and strongest (17.0% explained vari-
ance) factor together with gratitude and humor. Furthermore,
a ﬁfth factor resembles justice and was composed of fairness
and leadership, but also judgment, perspective, honesty, and
social intelligence. Finally, a factor of transcendence (8.1%) was
clearly marked by spirituality and beauty/excellence and to a
lower extent also by hope and gratitude. All except spirituality
had double loadings. Humor was clearly not part of transcen-
dence.
The labeling of the factors was underscored by the fact that the
mean prototypicality ratings (see Table 5) and the factor loadings
(Table 6) were very highly correlated. The more a strength was
seen to represent a virtue, the higher was its loading on a factor
labeled after this virtue. The coeﬃcients were particularly high for
humanity (r = 0.95), courage (r = 0.91), temperance (r = 0.90),
and lower for justice and transcendence (both: r = 0.95), and
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TABLE 6 | Varimax loadings of the 24 strengths of the six factors based on the analysis of the prototypicality ratings.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6
Creativity 0.04 0.73 0.41 −0.03 −0.11 0.11
Curiosity 0.09 0.78 0.35 0.02 0.02 0.14
Judgment 0.04 0.63 0.18 0.19 0.51 0.01
Love of learning 0.11 0.84 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.08
Perspective 0.13 0.66 −0.10 0.26 0.40 0.20
Bravery 0.05 0.11 0.86 0.02 0.15 0.00
Endurance 0.03 0.26 0.54 0.56 0.02 −0.14
Honesty 0.24 0.16 0.54 0.11 0.50 0.08
Zest 0.10 0.29 0.77 0.01 0.01 0.22
Love 0.85 0.10 0.14 0.04 −0.07 0.07
Friendliness 0.83 0.03 0.13 −0.01 0.16 0.20
Social intelligence 0.54 0.37 0.04 0.17 0.50 0.00
Teamwork 0.65 0.03 0.08 0.19 0.36 −0.11
Fairness 0.40 −0.06 0.14 0.10 0.75 0.03
Leadership 0.26 0.24 0.47 0.10 0.44 −0.25
Forgiveness 0.79 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.18 0.13
Modesty 0.43 0.03 0.02 0.67 0.11 0.29
Prudence 0.09 0.30 −0.11 0.71 0.25 0.06
Self-regulation 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.88 0.02 0.03
Beauty/excellence 0.17 0.47 0.07 0.01 −0.01 0.69
Gratitude 0.64 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.32 0.40
Hope 0.22 0.22 0.59 0.05 0.01 0.48
Humor 0.54 0.46 0.24 0.07 0.06 0.17
Spirituality 0.18 0.07 0.11 0.12 −0.01 0.82
Loadings ≥ 0.40 are shown in boldface.
somewhat lower for wisdom (r = 0.79; all p < 0.001). The
coeﬃcients between the non-homologous variables were between
r = −0.50 and r = 0.36.
Discussion
The present rating study provides support for the internal struc-
ture of the VIA-classiﬁcation of virtues and strengths but also
allows suggesting some changes. Most importantly, the scales are
indeed prototypical for the virtues with 10 exceeding 5.0 (i.e.,
being very goodmarkers), nine strengths exceeding 4.0 (i.e., being
good markers, and four exceeding 3.5 (i.e., being a marker) of the
virtue it was originally assigned to. Only one strength was not
considered prototypical: humor did fail to reach the cut-oﬀ value
of 3.5 for transcendence. Thus, the major outcome of the study
is that the assignment of the strengths to virtues as put forward
by Peterson and Seligman (2004) was correct with one exception.
For humor one might consider relocating this strength under
humanity, but it also shows relations to wisdom (Beermann and
Ruch, 2009a,b).
The second major outcome is that several strengths relate to
more than one virtue and occasionally they were found more
prototypical for a diﬀerent virtue then for the one they were
assigned to. In fact, the major diﬀerence between high and low
virtue strengths is the number of strengths they are prototypical
for (not only the degree of prototypicality). This has at least two
consequences. First, the fact that strengths may be prototypical
for more than one virtue means that rotation to simple struc-
ture inevitably will not be successful, as simple structure expects
variables to have a salient loading on only one factor, and zero
loadings on the other factors. Second, this has implications for
the theoretical model. Is a bi- or multimodal classiﬁcation feasi-
ble? Is it compatible with Linnaean thinking? Can one say that
the virtue of wisdom may not only be achieved through creativ-
ity, curiosity, or perspective but also through social intelligence
and prudence? And the former also fosters humanity and the
latter temperance? Shall the strengths that were more prototyp-
ical for a diﬀerent virtue be rearranged in the classiﬁcation and
handbook (Peterson and Seligman, 2004); i.e., shall leadership be
moved to courage, and teamwork, forgiveness, and gratitude be
subsumed under humanity? There is some convergence across
the prototypicality ratings and the results of the factor analysis
and these converging deviations do provide a basis for starting
to think about rearranging the entries of the classiﬁcation. The
present study only provides an initial step and more converging
evidence needs to be accumulated.
So far, work on the structure of the strengths and virtues have
been exclusively done in a factor-analytic framework. In such
articles the authors typically insinuate that Peterson and Seligman
(2004) had a hierarchical factor analytical model in mind just as
it is omnipresent in personality research. Without giving any fac-
tual evidence (i.e., a direct quote from the book or articles) for
this insinuation, authors typically proceed to say that they want
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to test this assumption (attributed to Peterson and Seligman)
empirically. Virtually everyone failed to conﬁrm what would be
a factor analyst’s dream, namely, that the strengths intercorre-
late in a way that there is a need to extract six factors, which can
be identiﬁed as the postulated virtues and are loaded highly by
the set of strengths assigned to that virtue (and only by those
strengths). Based on both our theoretical reasoning and on the
results of the present study we argue that running factor analyses
on the instruments measuring the VIA classiﬁcation is likely to
face three challenges: ﬁrst, studying the strengths-virtue relations
by identifying the structure derived from the intercorrelation of
the 24 strengths is bound to fail as the VIA-classiﬁcation is not a
factor-analytic model and virtues cannot be deﬁned by the inter-
correlation of strengths. Second imposing simple structure on the
derived factor matrices is comparable to forcing the data into
a Procrustean bed; i.e., ﬁtting into an unnatural scheme or pat-
tern. There is also a third problem that impairs ﬁnding a proper
structure using factor analysis, namely, strengths of justice and
strengths of humanity are more diﬃcult to separate as the for-
mer are strengths among, and strengths of love are strengths
between people, but the diﬀerence is assumed to be more of
degree than of kind. Thus, it is unlikely to ﬁnd the strengths
loading on diﬀerent factors. Perhaps the justice strengths jointly
should ﬁt under humanity; they should form one factor in a ﬁrst
step that then is—with the other strengths of humanity—a joint
factor of humanity. Indeed, in the present study all strengths
of justice were also covered by humanity but not vice versa,
humanity strengths were not covered by justice; only social intel-
ligence shows some fairly good prototypicality for justice. Here
more theoretical work is needed that then can lead to empirical
testing.
While we argue that factor analysis is not ideally suited to
test the relation between strengths and virtues we do not imply
that factor analyses of the strengths should not be conducted. It
allows ﬁnding redundancy in the scales and it is also interesting
to talk about the latent structure underlying the strengths—or the
strengths as represented in measurement instruments. However,
we do warn of two consequences: ﬁrst, factors should not be
expected to lead to the six virtues in the VIA classiﬁcation. More
importantly, we believe that it would be wrong to take such fac-
tors as the new reference and start deleting or adding strengths to
ﬁt these arbitrary factors.
The present study shows that humor might be the only
clearly misclassiﬁed strength as there is no apparent link to
transcendence. The pilot study showed that the ﬁve domains
of descriptions converged very strongly for humor. Hence, this
cannot be merely attributed to, for example, the items, which
do not emphasize the transcendence aspect strongly enough. In
fact, this was foreseen by Peterson and Seligman (2004) when
stating: “In a few cases, the classiﬁcation of a given strength
under a core virtue can be debated. Playfulness, for example,
might be considered a strength of humanity because humor and
whimsy can create social bonds. It might also be classiﬁed as
a wisdom strength, inasmuch as playfulness helps us acquire,
perfect, and use knowledge. But we had a reason for dubbing
playfulness a strength of transcendence: like hope and spiritual-
ity, playfulness connects us to something larger in the universe,
speciﬁcally the irony of the human condition, the incongruent
congruencies to which playful people call our attention, for our
education and amusement” (p. 26). The results of the present
study suggest that humor (as deﬁned in the VIA-classiﬁcation)
is linked to both humanity and wisdom (to a lower extent).
This underscores the results of prior studies that suggest that
while humor may be related to all virtues, the alignment is
most strongly for humanity and wisdom (Beermann and Ruch,
2009a,b; Müller and Ruch, 2011). This is the last issue to be
highlighted in improving the ﬁt between strengths and virtues.
One should consider for each strength whether it can serve only
one or more virtues, and if yes whether this should enter their
deﬁnition. For example, humor may reﬂect wisdom when the
incongruities people encounter in life are highlighted and this
then enables a person not to take things too seriously. Benevolent
humor serves humanity when we use it to brighten someone’s
day or when making others laugh at our misfortunes. Humor
in the form of understatement, especially as an alternative to
being upset, and moderated statements that do not hurt any-
one is in line with temperance. Satire and corrective humor may
serve justice when we correct a bully or oppressor and pro-
tect a victim or target. Humor reﬂecting the insight that from
a larger perspective our problems are minimal and as humans
we are all bound to fail and we should be accepting this might
relate to transcendence. So, at least for humor, the exact def-
inition of the strength may be varied to match the ﬁt to a
virtue.
This study has several limitations. The selection of the experts
and laypersons can be debated. We selected the experts based
on their expertise, but cannot exclude that a diﬀerent set of
experts would have come to diﬀerent conclusions. For exam-
ple, the experts from theology where mostly chairs in catholic
or protestant theology and maybe it would have been diﬀerent
if other religions had dominated. Also all experts were form the
German speaking countries. Therefore, a cross-validation of the
ﬁndings with a diﬀerent set of raters form diﬀerent parts of the
world might be desirable. We had roughly the same amount
of experts in personality, philosophy, and theology and hence
the results are balanced across these disciplines. However, it
became obvious that theologians were very diﬀerent from psy-
chologists and philosophers. They saw more of the strength
related to virtues and did not discriminate that much among
the virtues. This might be partly due their training and con-
victions but it might also be due to less familiarity with rating
scales. Clearly, in particular the results for theologians await
replication albeit the provided deﬁnitions of the virtues should
minimize the subjectivity. We had the experts do one judgment
and did not repeat it, so we do not know how stable these ratings
are.
Another shortcoming might be the deﬁnition of the virtues.
The core elements of the descriptions provided by Peterson and
Seligman (2004) were used. Allowing for a more extensive study
of the virtues might have been helpful, in particular to those that
were not that familiar with virtues, or particular virtues, such as
transcendence. Interestingly, also the laypersons did do compara-
bly well and yielded results that were comparable to the experts,
which means that the task was not that diﬃcult. A replication
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study might allow for more time to get familiar with the virtues
and maybe this will enhance the validity.
Conclusions
The links between strengths and virtues as suggested by the
present study are diﬀerent from both the original classiﬁcation
(Peterson and Seligman, 2004) and the factor analytic stud-
ies (e.g., McGrath, 2014). The lesson to be learned is that the
strengths may be in the service of several virtues simultaneously.
This is not really in contradiction to the classiﬁcation. If these
double relations are a problem, then the concept needs to be puri-
ﬁed and the contents that provide the link to the other virtues
need to be stripped oﬀ. Furthermore, the results also demon-
strate that studying the intercorrelation of the strengths is not
the golden road to arrive at virtues. From the intercorrelation
of strengths, a strength factor can be derived, but not neces-
sarily a virtue. While individuals may act in accordance with a
virtue to a certain extent (and thus produce individual diﬀerences
in a virtue), the virtues are not deﬁned by their mutual over-
lap among the strengths. The virtues exist independent of the
diﬀerent strengths that enable individuals to display that virtue.
There is a body of research that deﬁnes virtue factors though
intercorrelations of lexical virtue terms (e.g., De Raad and Van
Oudenhoven, 2011). There are factors such as sociability, achieve-
ment, respectfulness, vigor, altruism, and prudence (De Raad and
Van Oudenhoven, 2011) or self-conﬁdence, reﬂection, serenity,
rectitude, perseverance and eﬀort, compassion, and sociability
(Morales-Vives et al., 2014). Without going into detail, it can
be seen that these virtues do not seem to be of a more narrow
nature compared to “humanity” or “wisdom” and are more at
the level of strengths. Likewise the shorter lists still are more nar-
row, representing empathy, order, resourcefulness, and serenity
(Cawley et al., 2000). Therefore, it seems that the six core virtues
of Dahlsgaard et al. (2005) are only partially directly represented
in the virtue factors identiﬁed in the present study.
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